a collection of my essays, from 2022 to 2024
When is Compliance Complicity?
essay information
entered into 2024 locke essay contest, won a very high commendation
˗ˏˋ★‿︵‧ ˚ ₊⊹Introduction
The distinction between acts of compliance and complicity has been the subject of debate throughout history, from medieval tribunals holding soldiers accountable for the plunder and destruction of pirate villages to contemporary lawsuits against doctors accused of harming patients while following established legal guidelines. These instances highlight the fact that the current distinction between compliance and complicity is at best ambiguous and at worst contradictory in policy discussions.
The varying interpretations of the terms within different cultural and historical contexts further compound the complexities of this issue. For example, the post-World War II Nuremberg Trials brought global attention to the notion of "following orders" as a legitimate defense for committing crimes during warfare. Similarly, modern corporate scandals, such as those involving pharmaceutical companies knowingly selling and promoting harmful drugs, underscore the blurred lines between adhering to regulations and participating in unethical practices.
Despite the apparently nebulous distinction between these concepts—leading to easily exploitable policy loopholes—a clear demarcation can be established between compliance and complicity from ethical, legal, and political perspectives, expanded upon below. However, under specific circumstances, a compliant act can quickly become complicit. This essay proposes that an individual who engages in compliant actions or inactions and who harms or intends to achieve an unethical or illegal end should be considered complicit if they have the free will to defy.
1. Defining Compliance, Complicity, and Defiance
Both compliance and complicity are actions (or inactions) related to following orders while defiance is an action related to disobeying orders. In legal terms, compliance is recognized through "the correspondence of behavior with legal rules or laws." In comparison, ethical compliance is associated with following rules and occurs when "an individual changes his or her behavior from what it would have been otherwise in response to [a]... request" from someone or something with power over them, such as an employer or societal pressures.
Complicity "concerns acts which are… causal contributions to the wrongdoing of another agent." Within civilized society, complicity exists on a spectrum, ranging from "ordinary complicity"—the immoral actions that individuals partake in daily—to "true partners and collaborators"—those who are directly involved in illegal or unethical activities for immoral purposes and that affect large groups of people. One can be complicit in a crime "without… sharing the intent of the perpetrator" as long as the result is negative. Where both compliance and complicity involve cooperative action with a powerful authority, the key distinction between the two lies in the nature of the act and its consequences. Therefore, compliant acts that are not morally or ethically wrong and do not result in an outcome that harms others are not complicit.
Immigrants were encouraged to assimilate into the preexisting American culture and cast away their cultural traditions in favor of whatever was more “American”. Laws were created to repress the liberties, traditions, and particularisms of these newcomers, lest they stray from the path of becoming the ideal American immigrant.
Defiance, however, is a non-cooperative action and can be recognized when one shows "a disposition to challenge, resist, or fight" rather than remain obedient. When an individual possesses free will, they can choose to act defiantly rather than compliantly when doing so would make them complicit in wrongdoing.
2. Compliance, Complicity, and Defiance in Variations of the Trolley Problem
Consider three variations of the classic ethical dilemma "the trolley problem." In these three thought experiments, this essay will draw upon Kant's definition of a categorical imperative under the term "moral responsibility." The categorical imperative suggests that one must act according to the principle that one would want to become a universal law, or, on their best moral judgment. By possessing the free will to act ethically, it is then one's moral responsibility to have "exercised these powers" regardless of "consequences such as pain or pleasure."
First, suppose a rational bystander is ordered by a superior to destroy the braking system of a trolley and told that this action will injure the people tied on the track. Note that this variation of the trolley problem adds a superior and defines the action as immoral. If the bystander complies with the order and tampers with the trolley, that action will result in the injuries of the aforementioned victims. In this situation, the bystander is complicit, as the action contributes to the wrongdoing of the superior, results in a negative consequence, and is done with the knowledge that the victims will be injured. Even if the people tied on the track are absent, the bystander is still complicit in the crime because the action was performed with an immoral intention. If the bystander fully complies with the order, they will always be complicit in tampering with the braking system and the moral consequences that arise as a result.
Secondly, suppose the same rational bystander is ordered by a superior not to destroy the braking system but rather to press a button that will release a trolley onto a track with people tied on it. Pressing the button will injure the people on the track; however, the bystander is not told this. If the bystander complies, they are still complicit, as the action contributes to the wrongdoing of the superior and results in a negative consequence even if it is done without the knowledge that the victims will be injured. Such ignorance is often used to justify complicit actions, from minor injuries to war atrocities. Political philosopher Hanna Arendt states, in reference to the actions of soldiers who committed atrocities unknowingly while following orders in World War II, that "it was sheer thoughtlessness… that predisposed [soldiers] to become… [some] of the greatest criminals of that period" and that failing to assess and reject immoral orders does not excuse complicity. The ignorance of the soldiers could only be excused if no one was harmed by their actions. Similarly, the only instance in which the bystander is not complicit is if the people on the track are absent. Thus, the negative consequence is avoided and the bystander's intention, unlike in the first variation, is not immoral.
Finally, suppose the bystander is ordered by a superior to refrain from moving a switch that will unbind the people from the track, saving them from a rogue trolley. In this case, if the bystander complies, they will be expressly performing an inaction rather than an action. Since the bystander has the free will to do the morally correct thing, their inaction is the manifestation of refusing their moral responsibility. If the bystander complies with the order and does not move the switch, they will always be complicit.
Thus, the only way the bystander can avoid complicity, if the consequence is negative or the intention immoral, is to become defiant. Defiance would occur when, for example, rather than remain obedient to an unethical command, the bystander challenges the order by refusing to tamper with the brakes, declining to press the button, or moving the switch.
Through these variations of the trolley problem, one can conclude that in the event that a compliant act is either immoral or will result in an outcome that will harm others, any action other than defiance represents complicity with the crime, whether legal or ethical. Furthermore, when the notion of Kant's "moral responsibility" is invoked, additional circumstances such as a threat of pain or a promise of pleasure to motivate the bystander to comply with the order do not change the complicity of their actions. That is, even if the bystander might be inclined to comply with the order due to a personal positive consequence, such as a reward of money, or negative consequence, such as a threat of injury, so long as they have the free will to defy the order, it would be an ethical wrongdoing to forfeit one's moral responsibility for selfish self-preservation or satisfaction.
3. Implications of Free Will in Complicity
Both legally and ethically, the distinguishing factor between compliance and complicity hinges on the concept of "moral responsibility" and the notion of "free will," as demonstrated in the trolley problems. When an individual has the free will to behave morally, they have the responsibility to become defiant if ordered to perform an action that would be deemed a legal or ethical wrongdoing, even if there are circumstances that might encourage that individual to comply.
The Nuremberg Trials of Nazi war criminals provide a significant historical example of the distinction between compliance and complicity when factoring in free will. During these trials, many German soldiers and leaders defended their actions by claiming that because they "[knew] it was contrary to the law of nations" and only performed the actions that were both illegal (in most countries, and now, internationally) and immoral in response to orders from their supervisors. This defense, known as the superior order of Nuremberg Defense, "holds that soldiers must follow orders and that they cannot be held responsibly [sic] for doing so." This concept became a focal point in these trials, raising the question of whether obedience to authority could excuse participation in atrocities. Of course, being complicit in a crime is different from direct wrongdoing— those who set atrocities into motion should be punished differently from those who followed orders. However, both legally and ethically, simply following orders neither "excuses nor justifies the act," as, despite an inclination to follow orders, these soldiers had both the free will and the power to defy their superiors. As touched upon by this essay's discussion of Arendt above, many soldiers and officers pleaded "that they had only 'done their duty,' but it was not their duty to obey orders if these orders were criminal"— in fact, it was their responsibility to behave morally above all else. Through these trials, it was concluded that the argument of a superior order "is plausible only when the orders themselves are morally neutral or morally necessary" and that all soldiers categorized as followers had the free will to be deemed complicit, even when their actions were done to comply with orders.
Cults, however, offer a unique lens involving situations where an individual lacks free will. Consider the case of the infamous Peoples Temple. Members who joined the cult and later recruited others played a role in perpetuating the group's harmful practices, culminating in the 1978 Jonestown mass murder-suicide. While the adults in the cult are complicit in the wrongdoings of their superior, the Reverend Jones, a child born into the cult and raised without an understanding of society's moral guidelines would not be considered complicit, as "the developmental processes of childhood and adolescence are hijacked." Children who are born and raised on a cult's skewed beliefs do not have an accurate gauge of moral behaviors, so they have a "diminished capacity to act independently and rationally," restricting their free will and excusing their behavior to a significant extent. An adult who joins the cult later in life has "experiences and an education that provide[s] a framework for questioning the cult's teachings," and cannot be excused from such complicit behaviors. When comparing the behavior of adults and children, the distinction between whether one possesses the capacity for independent thought and moral judgment when evaluating compliance and complicity becomes clear.
The implications of free will in complicity underscore the necessity of evaluating moral responsibility within the context of compliance. Historical precedents like the Nuremberg Trials and contemporary examples such as cult dynamics reveal that individuals who possess the capacity for independent thought and moral judgment—free will—should be held accountable for their actions. The distinction between compliance and complicity depends on the presence of free will and the capacity for moral responsibility, necessitating a nuanced approach to recognizing both the presence and lack of free will when determining if an individual is complicit.
Conclusion
Except for rare situations in which both negative consequences do not exist and there is no immoral intent present, all situations involving a compliant action performed by a rational individual with free involves a level of complicity. This is not to say that every complicit action should have legal consequences but rather to call for a redefinition of what complicity means in policy. From both an ethical and legal perspective, the distinction between compliance and complicity is clear, ultimately supporting the conclusion that all compliant actions or inactions that harm others or aim to achieve unethical or illegal ends should be deemed acts of complicity.
